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TRACES OF AUSTRIAHUNGARY AND
THE FIRST WORLD
WA R I N T S A R I S T /
SOVIET/RUSSIAN
C I N E M AT O G R A P H Y
Verena Moritz

The “Great War” and its “Comeback”
Against the backdrop of the 100th anniversary, Russia’s evident
interest in the history of the years from 1914 to 1917/18 was
often perceived as a revival of a long suppressed and unwanted
commemoration. In 2014, Russia, it seemed, rediscovered World
War One. A “war forgotten” was remembered in various exhibitions, scientific and popular publications, illustrated books, TVdocumentary films, and even in the cinema. The way the Great
War was exhibited, characterized, interpreted, and adapted for
the screen in some cases more or less obviously corresponded to
Russia’s present-day self-portrayal as “home of the brave.” Those
brave men and women dominated the filmic narratives of WWI
in 2014, and the general public must have been convinced that
Russian soldiers’ overwhelming patriotism and readiness to make
sacrifices during WWI would result in a just and well-deserved
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victory, unless their enemies and allies were more or less satanic
combatants (especially the German Empire) and deceitful traitors (France and Great Britain). According to this interpretation,
Russia was abused by its allies and had to carry the major burden
of the war. Obviously, an analogy between past and present was
intended by the architects of a strong patriotism and a new patriotic culture in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which was ostracized
by the USA and the European Union since at least its proceeding
in the Crimea and in the Ukraine. The message is clear: Russia
stood alone during the First World War, cheated by its allies and
beaten only because of a revolution that was supported by the
Germans, and it stands alone now, misapprehended and wrongly
stigmatized by the rest of the world, which, without plausible
reason, considers itself morally and ethically superior to Russia.
In 2014, on 1 August, when Putin inaugurated a monument to
Russian soldiers of the First World War, he offered a “stab-in-theback explanation of Tsarist Russia’s defeat and collapse,” alluding
“of course, to the Bolsheviks” who had been sent to Russia by the
Germans.1 In doing this, the Russian President more or less adopted the perception of emigrated Tsarist officers who had interpreted
the lost war as a “German-Bolshevik plot to destroy the nation.”2 In
1

Many thanks to J. Köstenberger and V. Denisov for their help regard-

ing investigations for this article in Moscow.
Transliteration of Russian follows Library of Congress transliteration table.
Cf. Vladimir Socor, “Putin Re-Interprets Russia´s Participation in the
First World War,” in Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume 11, no. 143 (2008). accessed Jan. 25, 2016, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=42714&no_cache=1.
2

Aaron J. Cohen, “Oh, That! Myth, Memory, and World War I in the

Russian Emigration and in the Soviet Union,” Slavic Review 62, no. 1
(Spring 2003): 69–86, here: 74.
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any case, Putin spoke of “‘re-establishing the unbroken continuity
of our history,’ incorporating the First World War’s ‘sacred memory’
into the official accounts of Russia´s history. […] Amid its ongoing
war against Ukraine, the Kremlin is reaching into history to recuperate yet another militarist narrative for popular consumption.”3
There are many critical and stimulating analyses of Russia’s past
and current commemorative culture and the official conception of
history that was repeatedly modified even in the Soviet era.4 After
1989 and the following fundamental changes that Eastern Europe,
including the USSR, faced, a mere reversal of former interpretations by communist doctrines in regard to the history before
and after the Bolsheviks seized power was an evident temptation
for those countries. In post-Soviet Russia, historiography ran
through various phases of reorientation. Putin’s Russia obviously
did not abandon communist interpretations of the past as a whole,
in order to adapt them for its own purposes. As a result, Stalin, for
example, remains the “father of the nation” who led Soviet people
to a glorious victory against German barbarism between 1941
and 1945. Historiography and the conception of history in today’s
Russia are not free from contradictions. Still accepted communist
interpretations of history and a reinterpretation of communist
history as an antipode of former narratives are in juxtaposition
with each other, but they somehow coexist. Moreover, popular
interpretations of history introduce additional dimensions. But
all of those variations that are initiated or accepted by official
Russia, notwithstanding the lack of stringent reflections, share
3

Ibid.

4

See for example: Lars Karl and Igor J. Polianski, eds., Geschichtspoli-

tik und Erinnerungskultur im neuen Russland (Göttingen: V&R unipress,
2009); or Catherine Merridale, Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Twentieth Century Russia (London: Granta, 2000).
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the same intended purpose: the strengthening of patriotism,
completed by the advice to distrust the world beyond the borders of Russia.5
In regard to the appraisal of the role of the Tsarist army, recent
Russian fiction and documentary films have made a distinct turning away from former communist perceptions. Nonetheless, there
are some striking continuities to Soviet cinema as, for instance,
the near complete absence of Austria-Hungary.
The Tsarist Empire and the War on the Screen
After 1945, the so-called “Habsburg myth” played an important
role in the process of identity in the Second Austrian Republic.
While World War One itself was largely neglected in cultural
5

It has to be underlined that this text concentrates on the Russian offi-

cial narratives in films on the First World War. There are, of course a lot of
“deviant” interpretations including, for example, differentiated approaches
by historians. In this respect, it has to be mentioned that, in 2012, Kees
Boterbloem has examined Russian historiography of the First World War
in regard of the Russian participation. He saw a lack of Russian-language
monographs on Russia in WWI and reasoned that this lack had “much to
do with the continued unease felt in Russia about the Great War.” Boterbloem´s result obviously differs from recent interpretations of the First
World War and Russia’s role by official Russia today. Cf. Kees Boterbloem,
“‘Chto delat’?: World War I in Russian Historiography after Communism,”
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25, no. 3 (2012), 393–408, accessed
Feb. 1, 2016, DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2012.705655. On historiography of
the Russian Revolution with an overview of current Russian interpretations of the Revolution see: S. A. Smith, “The Historiography of the Russian Revolution 100 Years on,” in Kritika 16, no. 4 (Fall 2015), 733–749.
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avenues, completely uncritical depictions of Habsburg history
presented the Austro-Hungarian Empire as role model for a peaceful coexistence of different nations and Franz Joseph I as the “the
good old Kaiser.” The Dual Monarchy was portrayed as an ideal
state, and in regard of World War One, this “paradise” was only
misled and abused by the Germans seeking world supremacy.
After World War II, the Austrian people have become accustomed
to such interpretations of the Habsburg past. They could not even
imagine that Austria-Hungary was not seen in a similar way in
other countries. Austrian feature films of the 1950s introduced
soldiers of the “k.u.k.” army as clumsy and harmless guys or as
smart womanizers. The First World War on the screen, all in all,
was either completely absent or presented as if there had been
neither misery nor bloodshed, but only “Waltz” and “Schmaltz.”6
It was unthinkable that soldiers of the Habsburg army had committed war crimes.7 In addition, historiography for decades focused on Germany, claiming that the militant Kaiserreich bear the
chief responsibility for the war that started in summer 1914. The
Danube Monarchy was either exculpated or more or less ignored.
Until now, some historians complain, Austria-Hungary is rather
perceived as victim of German warmongers than as autonomous
player.8 In fact, there was already a movement to marginalize the
Habsburg monarchy during the war, concentrating on its lack of
6

Sabine A. Haring, “Between the Topos of a ´Forgotten War´ and the

Current Memory Boom: Remembering the First World War in Austria,”
in Remembering the First World War, ed. Bart Ziino (London: Routledge,
2015), 207–222, here: 214–216.
7

See for example: Karin Moser, ed., Besetzte Bilder: Film, Kultur und Pro-

paganda in Österreich 1945–1955 (Vienna: Verlag Filmarchiv Austria, 2005).
8

Lothar Höbelt, “Stehen oder Fallen?” Österreichische Politik im Ersten

Weltkrieg (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2015), 131.
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strength and its dependence on German economic and military
support. The longer the war lasted, Entente powers tended to perceive Austria-Hungary as a pure appendix of German authorities, as
“junior partner” of the Kaiserreich, which made important decisions
without asking the young Habsburg Emperor Karl. Nevertheless,
for Tsarist Russia, the Danube monarchy was its main adversary.
While in 1914 Germany’s main effort was concentrated against
France, requiring approximately ninety percent of its manpower,
Austria deployed the bulk of its forces against Russia.9
So, how did Tsarist cinematic propaganda portray the Danube
monarchy, whose conflict with Serbia figured at the beginning of
a European war that broadened to a world wide struggle? Whom
did Russian cinema blame for the outbreak of the conflict that,
in the end, swept away the Romanovs and their Empire? Who
was deemed to be “worse” or more “condemnable”? The German
Empire or the Danube monarchy? And was Russian film production able to comply with the requirements of an effective
propaganda?
The war seriously affected Russian cinema: “On the eve of the
conflict nearly 90 percent of film productions shown in Russia
had come from abroad.”10 Before the war, a large number of films
distributed in Russia had been of German origin. After the outbreak of hostilities, French film companies in Russia especially
9

Timothy C. Dowling, “Eastern Front,” in 1914–1918-online: Inter-

national Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. Ute Daniel et al. (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin 2014), DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15463/
ie1418.10316.
10

Alexandre

Sumpf,

“Film/Cinema

(Russian

Empire),”

in

1914–1918-online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed.
by Ute Daniel et al. (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2014), DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.15463/ie1418.10383.
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benefited.11 Besides, the Tsarist Empire saw a growing number of
Russian companies and “the strengthening of national champions,
as the Khanzhonkov, Drankov and Ermol[´]ev Studios.”12 Native
film production increased rapidly. On the other hand, “it would
be a mistake to underestimate the profound influence of Western
European filmmaking had overall in Russian filmmakers and
audiences.”13 German companies, however, were forced to shut
down their production, and German theater owners and distributors were exiled. In 1915, all German films were banned.14
Tsarist propaganda identified Germany as a responsible aggressor and as the most dangerous enemy, “the one against which the
greatest patriotic efforts had to be directed.”15 Germans turned out
to be the main target of people’s anger in Russian metropoles, and
anti-German riots seemed to express the degree of hate toward the
enemy, including the German minority in Russia.16 Spy mania was
widespread already before the war and explosively increased during
the July Crisis 1914. German speaking people, including Jews, were
11

In 1914, ninety percentof the films distributes internationally in the

world were French; Michael Wood, Film: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: University Press, 2012), 48
12

Sumpf, “Film/Cinema (Russian Empire).” On the Russian “Movie

Moguls” see: Louise McReynolds, Russia at Play: Leisure Activities at the
End of the Tsarist Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 269–276.
13

Denise J. Youngblood, The Magic Mirror: Moviemaking in Russia

1908–1918 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,1999), 13.
14

Hubertus F. Jahn, Patriotic Culture in Russia During World War I

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 152.
15

Jahn, Patriotic Culture,173.

16

On the riots in Moscow of 26–29 May 1915 see: Eric Lohr, “Patriotic

Violence and the State: The Moscow Riots of May 1915,” in Kritika 4, no. 3
(Summer 2003), 607–626.
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considered the prime suspects by Tsarist counterintelligence, and
“private citizens flooded government agencies with denunciations
of suspected spies.”17 Recently, however, Russian historians have
questioned if Germanophobia would have emerged that intensely
without the massive efforts of propaganda especially in 1914–15.18
Russian propaganda had to go all out to shape a convincing concept of the enemy. Finally, “convincing” meant to present a primitive
and distorted image. Germany and its “Kaiser” were demonized,
and Wilhelm was portrayed as the “Antichrist.”19 In a feature film
of the same title (Antichrist), the German Emperor acted like a real
17

Jonathan W. Daly, “Security Services in Imperial and Soviet Rus-

sia,” in Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 4, no. 4 (Fall
2003), 955–974, here: 969.
18

See respective deliberations in contributions of: Wladimir Fed-

juk, “Der Kampf gegen die ´deutsche Überfremdung´ in der russischen
Provinz,” in Verführungen der Gewalt: Russen und Deutsche im Ersten und
Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Karl Eimermacher and Astrid Volpert (Munich:
Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005), 95–119; Boris Kolonizkij, “Metamorphosen der Germanophobie: Deutschland in den politischen Konflikten der
Februarrevolution,” in Verführungen der Gewalt: Russen und Deutsche im
Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Karl Eimermacher and Astrid Volpert
(Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005), 121–144; Dimitrij Olejnikow, “Von
Ritterlichkeit zu Verachtung: Auswirkungen des Ersten Weltkriegs auf das
Verhältnis zu den Deutschen,” in Verführungen der Gewalt: Russen und
Deutsche im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Karl Eimermacher and Astrid Volpert (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005), 179–204.
19

Jekaterina Chochlowa, “Vom Dialog zu Konfrontation: Russischer

und deutscher Film zwischen den Weltkriegen,” in Stürmische Aufbrüche
und enttäuschte Hoffnungen: Russen und Deutsche in der Zwischenkriegszeit, ed. Karl Eimermacher and Astrid Volpert (Munich: Wilhelm
Fink Verlag, 2006), 927–952, 930.
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monster, brutal and completely immoral.20 According to the belief
of some Russian peasants, he was even drinking human blood.21 The
film was very popular and became a tremendous box office hit, as an
exhibitor from Moscow wrote in the Kine-zhurnal.22 Wilhelm was
a “negative hero,” a character that united all what was considered
to be evil. He was blamed to be responsible for the shocking attacks
on Belgian civilians committed by his soldiers. In Liliia Bel´gii (The
Lily of Belgium, 1915, directed by Ladislas Starevich), an animated
film that is perceived as a masterpiece of early Russian cinematography, German soldiers figured as “barbaric Huns” who “raped”
Belgium.23 The film journal Ėkran Rossii called the film an “allegory”
of Belgium´s “suffering.”24 Far from “allegory,” however, was the plot
of Dykhanie antikhristov (The breath of the antichrists), which was
released in 1915 by the company G.I. Libken. In this film, German
soldiers are not only killing Russian prisoners of war, but also raping
women, beating children, and burning down peaceful villages. The
journal Sine-fono predicted a huge success of Dychanie antichristov.25
“War terror films played extensively on the audience’s fascination with the unknown and therefore dangerous aspects of the
20

Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 166.

21

Sine-fono, no. 13 (April 25, 1915), 90.

22

Sine-fono, no. 14-15 (May 23, 1915), 78–79.

23

Sumpf, “Film/Cinema (Russian Empire).”

24

Ekran Rossii, no. 1 (1916), 20.

25

Sine-fono, no. 19-20 (Aug. 22, 1915), 66. See also pictures from the

film in: Vestnik Kinematografii, no. 114 (1915), 15–16, 32, 51, 53. There
was a Russian film—perhaps—Dychanie antichristov that showed German
nurses, searching through the battlefields and stabbing Russian wounded
soldiers; Arthur Ponsonby, Absichtliche Lügen in Kriegszeiten: Eine Auswahl von Lügen, die während des Ersten Weltkrieges in allen Völkern verbreitet wurden (Seeheim: Buchkreis, 1967), 135.
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war. The psychological function was clearly more important than
the historical authenticity of the episodes. In this respect, it should
be noted that ‘German horrors’ were already being advertised in a
film produced at the very outbreak of the war, before any atrocities
had been reported.”26 It has to be noted that the Russian audience,
seemingly already before the war, preferred more dramatic and
morbid films than the Western moviegoers: Russia’s movie studios
had “manufactured dreams that audiences in other cultures would
have considered nightmares.”27 Obviously, people found “unhappy
endings” more consolatory than “happy endings” that were far from
real life.28 This, perhaps, helps to understand why in 1916 a film
with the depressing title The Poor Chap Died in an Army Hospital
was one of the most viewed picture in wartime Russia.29
26

Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 166. “All the belligerents in World War One

employed atrocity propaganda associated with the enemy and, as a result,
stereotypes emerged that had been largely developed in the period leading
up to the outbreak of war. The recognition of stereotypes is an important
part of understanding the use of anti-symbols and the portrayal of the
enemy in propaganda”; David Welch, “Depicting the enemy,” British Library, accessed Feb. 2, 2016, http://www.bl.uk/world-war-one/articles/depicting-the-enemy. See also: David Welch and Jo Fox, eds., Justifying War:
Propaganda, Politics and the Modern Age (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
27

McReynolds, Russia at Play, 290. See also: 276.

28

See also: Richard Stites, Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment

and Society Since 1900 (Cambridge: University Press, 1992), 33–34. With
explanations for the Russian type of “melodrama”: Schamma Schahadat, “Leidenschaft und Ökonomie: Das russische Stummfilm-Melodrama
zwischen Fin de Siècle und Moderne,” arcadia: International Journal of
Literary Culture 44, no. 1 (Jan. 2009): 137–186, here: 160 and 140–142.
29

Sumpf, “Film/Cinema (Russian Empire).”
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“Fear and horror” attracted an audience that wanted to learn
what the enemy was like. German war crimes flourished in all
Russian arts. Some popular Russian feature films interestingly
mainly focused on violence committed on the French front rather
than on the situation in Galicia, East-Prussia, or Armenia.30 But,
by only skimming over the pages of Russian film journals,31 one
will realize that there are some feature films, like the above mentioned Dykhanie antikhristov and various documentary films, that
dealt with atrocities on the Russian Western Front. The latter were
shown in various newsreels (kinokhronika), produced, for example, by the Skobelev Committee, which, in 1914, “had obtained
exclusive rights from the emperor to film on the front lines, to
raise funds for soldiers wounded in combat with the sale of the
footage.”32 The Skobelev Committee, however, was ill-equipped
and underfunded. Less than a dozen cameramen tried to get
pictures of military operations and life at the front lines. Hence,
historians claim, the Skobelev Committee was not able to provide
a visual record of the war on the Russian Western Front and that,
consequently, Russian moviegoers learned more about what was
30

Ibid. and Alexandre Sumpf, “In Szene gesetzt: Der Erste Weltkrieg

im russischen und sowjetischen Kino,” Osteuropa 64, no. 2–4 (Februar–
April 2014): 339–350, here: 340; Kine-zhurnal, no. 19-20 (Oct. 18, 1914).
31

On Russian film journals see for example: Natascha Drubek, Rus-

sisches Licht: Von der Ikone zum frühen sowjetischen Film (Vienna: Böhlau,
2012), 117.
32 Sumpf, “Film/Cinema (Russian Empire).” On the history of the film
department of the Skobelev-Committee see also: G. E. Malysheva, “K istorii kinematograficheskoi dejatel´nosti Sokobelevskogo komiteta 19131914 gg. Opyt i metodiki issledovatel´skoi raboty spetsialistov Rossiiskogo
gosaudarstevennogo archiva kinodokumentov (RGAKFD),” in Vestnik archivista, no. 1 (2012): 3–17.
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going on at the theaters of War of their allies.33 Undoubtedly, footages delivered by France or Great Britain outnumbered Russian
newsreels to give an impression of the war. But, obviously, at least
in 1914–15, Russian feature as well as documentary films on war
crimes committed by the enemies did not completely omit the
Western Front. After all, to show enemy barbarity on the screen
was a matching part to press propaganda, where news about cruelties of the adversary had become ubiquitous.34
Violence against Tsarist prisoners of war in Austria-Hungary
was picked up by Russian propaganda, which published various
pamphlets or reports of soldiers who succeeded in escaping. It
is not amazing, that atrocities committed by Austrian-Hungarian
soldiers did also reach the screen.35 Only few weeks after the
outbreak of war the Kine-zhurnal announced the release of the
feature film Tsivilizovannye varvary (Civilized barbarians), where
Austrian soldiers arrested a defenseless young woman and only at
the last moment were restrained from shooting an old man who
was suspected to be a spy. Interestingly, at the end of the description of the film in the Kine-zhurnal, the old man is dooming the
33

Peter Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 1917–1953 (New York: Cam-

bridge University Press,1992), 22.
34

Cf. Laurent Véray, “Cinema,” in The Cambridge History of the First

World War, vol. 3, Civil Society, ed. Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 475–503, here: 492. See also: World War I and
Propaganda, ed. Troy R.E. Paddock (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1.
35

On atrocities committed by Austro-Hungarian soldiers and the “im-

age” of them among Russians see: Elena S. Senjavskaja, “Die Völker Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg aus der Sicht des russischen Gegners,”
in Jenseits des Schützengrabens: Der Erste Weltkrieg im Osten. Erfahrung
– Wahrnehmung – Kontext, ed. Bernhard Bachinger and Wolfram Dornik
(Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2013), 325–340.
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“German hangmen” (“palacham-nemtsam”) and not the Austrian
ones.36 Another movie, which was also produced by the company
of A. O. Drankov, is described in the same issue of the mentioned
zhurnal and deals with the very first period of the war, too: Za tsarja i otechestvo ili liudi-brat´ia (For Tsar and fatherland). It shows
the situation at the frontier to Austria-Hungary shortly after the
hostilities had started. The Austrians are brutal, but they act cowardly, unsuccessfully trying to incite the different nations against
the Russians: “Russians, Jews, Georgians, Ingush: all are fighting
to save the home country.”37 Generally, the Austrian brutes are
of German or Polish origin. Concentrating on those nations, the
propaganda corresponded with existent animosity and distrust.
It was plausible that the scene of anti-Austrian feature films was
mainly situated in the neighboring Austrian crownland Galicia,
with its multifaceted ethnic conflicts.
Due to Germany’s part as the aggressor to blame the most for
the outbreak of war it makes sense that Russian wartime feature
films mostly focused on Germany and the Germans, who were
transgressing “all moral and religious bounds.”38 On the other
hand, there are no studies on Russian film production in wartime
that are trying to find out if there were significant differences in
presenting either the German or the Austrian or the GermanAustrian (German speaking Austrians/Deutschösterreicher)
enemies on the screen. A first and rough analysis of Russian
wartime feature films, based on Russian film journals published
between 1914 and 1917 and filmographies for this period, supports the assumption that patriotic feature films dealing with
“anti-German plots” predominate. But is has to be stated that the
36

Kine-zhurnal, no. 15-16 (Aug. 23, 1914): 33.

37

Ibid.

38

Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 165.
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“German preponderance” in comparison with Austria-Hungary’s
presence is less striking than supposed—at least at the beginning of war.39
Tsarist filmic propaganda used traditional stereotypes of the
enemy states and intensified and even exaggerated them to the
point of a burlesque: “As in other warring nations, enemy leaders
became convenient personifications and focal points of broader
sets of clichés. […] Images of a weak and crumbling empire, expressing imperial rivalry with Austria, were projected onto the
figure of the old and frail Franz Joseph.”40 But did the Habsburg
monarchy, which was considered to be weak and damned to
crumble, appear to be less dangerous than the “German huns”?
And did Russian cinema portray Franz Joseph in a similar way as
it did German Kaiser Wilhelm?
In 1916, when the Kine-zhurnal indicated that there were about
4,000 motion picture theaters in Russia, with two million moviegoers a day,41 a film about the tragedy of the Austrian crown
prince Rudolf and his concubine Mary Vetsera was advertised.42
Mariia Vechera, produced by the company Drankov, was obviously released already in the year before and announced as film
39

See for instance: Velikii kinemo: Katalog sokhranivshikhsia igrovykh

fil´mov Rossii 1908–1919 (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2002);
V. Vishnevskii, Dokumental´nye fil´my dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii 1907–1916
gg. (Moscow, 1996); Ven. Vishnevskii, Khudozhestvennye fil´my dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii (Filmograficheskoe opisanie) (Moscow: Goskinoizdat,
1945); S. S. Ginzburg, Kinematografiia dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii (Moscow,
1963); Sovetskie khudozhestvennye fil´my: Annotirovannyi katalog (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1961).
40

Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 173.

41

Kine-zhurnal, no.15-18 (1916): 82.

42

Kine-zhurnal, no. 19-20 (1916): 104.
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about a “secret affair in the live of a foreign court.”43 In this picture, retelling the history of the unhappy son of Emperor Franz
Joseph who killed his concubine and then committed suicide, the
audience is confronted with an abstruse version of the tragedy:
the pregnant Mary Vetsera and her blue-blooded lover Rudolf
are shot by officers who were instructed by Franz Joseph to arrest Rudolf ’s concubine. The death of the old monarch’s only son
buries the hopes of a whole Empire. Franz Joseph and Empress
Elisabeth figure as broken parents. One can suppose that there is
some sort of compassion toward the aged “Kaiser,” who had lost
his son under such tragic circumstances.44
In 1932, the magazine Proletarskoe kino analyzed Russian wartime propaganda and asserted that the Germans had been portrayed as barbarians, whereas the Austrians had been described as
cowards and scoundrels.45 As I have already shown in connection
with Russian film productions shortly after the outbreak of war,
there are some examples that illustrate that Austrians were considered to be cruel and merciless as well, notwithstanding portraying
Franz Joseph as an old and broken-hearted man. In fact, there was
no need for Russian propaganda to present the Austrian enemies
as less damnable than the German ones. Above all, the oppression
of Russia’s “Slavonic brothers” by Habsburg authorities served as a
drastic example of the wickedness of the neighbor. This, for example,
correlated with a film that was released in 1916 and advertised by the
company Gomon as “vigorous drama.” V okovakh Avstrii (In Austria’s
chains) follows the experience of young Anton, living in Galicia. An
Austrian named Prokop wants to get rid of him because he desires
43

Kine-zhurnal, no. 13-14 (1915): 116.

44

Kine-zhurnal, no. 19-20 (1916): 112–113.

45
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Anton´s girlfriend, Praskeda. Because of Prokop’s influence, Anton
is enlisted by the Austrian army. Now Anton is full of hatred against
Austria-Hungary. He decides to desert and fight against the Habsburg
monarchy.46 Finally, he is arrested by Austrian authorities and sentenced to death. His lady lover Prakseda goes mad and is killed by
Anton’s uncle to “save” her from Austrian cruelties. The advertising
pictures in Kine-zhurnal show a Russian soldier (probably Anton)
who is executed by Austro-Hungarian soldiers.47
Austrian brutality is also the main subject in a feature film
on Czechs who had acquired Russian citizenship and united in
a “legion of victory or death.” The film, titled Druzhina pobedy
ili smerti, showed the tragic fate of “Czech heroes” who fought
against Austrian oppressors and had to face the death penalty
when being caught by the Austrians. In fact, “some 10 per cent
of Czech prisoners volunteered” for the Czechoslovak Legion in
Russia.48 The film Druzhina pobedy ili smerti was announced as an
impressive example for the struggle between Slavs and Germans.49
Furthermore, Slava nam – smert´ vragam (Glory to us, death to
the enemy), a film directed by Evgenjj Bauer and produced by A.
Khanzhonkov, showed that heroism could overcome apparently
invincible enemies: Disguised as an Austrian nurse, the heroine
of this film stabs a love-crazed Austro-Hungarian officer to get
an important secret message. In the end, she is decorated with
military honors, after having handed over the secret documents
to Russian troops.50 However, Slava nam – smert´ vragam did not
46
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reveal “before the audience … ‘scandalous and blatant horrors’,”
with the exception of “almost colorless, grey episodes in which
the nightmare of reality appears so clearly.”51
Whereas the treason of former Austrian citizens was interpreted
as a heroic act, espionage was either damned or appreciated, depending on the question who was spying and for whom: “Espionage
and treason fitted nicely into a wave of detective novels and films
that swept over the Western world and Russia alike.” 52 Many of
these films merely adapted the war to an established taste, but some
contained more or less elaborate patriotic messages. In fact, there
were a lot of spy films that focused on German espionage in particular.53 The writer and son of Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaia,
Konstantin Breshko-Breshkovskii, succeeded as the author of some
of those spy films, where male and female spies were trying to obtain secrets about Russian warfare. Breshko-Breshkovskii appeared
as a screenplay writer for a film, titled Grafinia-shpionka (avstrijskaia avantiura). The film was released only few days before the
war broke out, and unlike the majority of spy films, concentrated on
espionage of Austrian and not German provenience.54
Spy films perfectly suited to a popular taste that, from the very
beginning of the war, preferred plain entertainment and “the usual
fare that had been popular before the war.”55 Feature films with war
themes “were the crude and sensationalist fruits of savage competition among film companies. Superlatives of terror, baseness,
51
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brutality, and schmaltz advertised artistically weak and overhastily lubok farces, patriotic spy and detective movies, nationalist
love affairs and melodramas, and thrilling and apocalyptic ‘terror
films.’”56
While, in 1915, the Skobelev committee praised itself for a
realistic depiction of war in its documentary films,57 escapism increased as the war dragged on.58 The retreat of the Russian army as
a result of Austro-German victories in 1915 left its marks on the
Russians. It was perceived as a disastrous and disgraceful defeat,
destroying the vision of a glorious victory. Patriotism “became
more differentiated, simultaneously reflecting separate and even
disparate loyalties within society.”59 This development as a matter of course affected Russian film production, too. According
to Denise J. Youngblood from “1 August 1914 to the end of the
year, nearly half of films made (50 to 103) concerned the war, but
in 1916 the figure was only 13 titles out of a total of 500. This
startling fact reflects in large part the extreme disaffection of the
public from the government and the war effort—as well as the
56
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government’s inability to organise cinematic propaganda.”60 Peter
Kenez comes to similar conclusions, considering the absence of
a centralized propaganda institution: “The outbreak of the war
made a difference in the character of the Russian feature film not
as result of the purposeful intervention of the government, but
because the filmmakers shared the momentary enthusiasm for
war, and because they believed that their audiences would pay to
see patriotic films.”61 But, as soon as the enthusiasm faded, and it
became clear that the war was not going to become a short and
glorious combat, Russian film production turned to more promising genres.
In the period between the two Revolutions of 1917 not only the
Skobelev committee was preoccupied with its reorganization;62
the whole film and cinema business was seeking re-orientation:
“Ideology entered Russian cinema with the Fall of the Romanov
dynasty in February 1917. A brief look at titles of some of the
films released in that year is sufficient to grasp the anti-monarchist and radical public mood: Dark Forces: Grigorii Rasputin and
his Associates; In the Clutches of Judas; Governmental Deception;
The Revolutionary, The Bourgeois, Enemy of the People.”63 The Kinezhurnal in June 1917, for instance, announced the production
60
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about the last Tsar and his “bloody reign.”64 However, 1917 was
more a caesura for film producers than for the audience itself,
who still preferred entertainment films.65
There was a noticeable uncertainty in regard to the future of
Russian film production. By the end of 1917, rumors about
Bolshevik plans to nationalize Russian cinematography alarmed,
as the Kine-zhurnal stated, everyone who was in some way involved in the production or distribution of movies.66 Starting
in May 1918, the Bolshevik newsreel Kino-Nedelja from time to
time recalled the World War by showing “remains” of the conflict:
for example, German and Austro-Hungarian POWs departing
or homecoming Russian POWs.67 After the October Revolution,
the exodus of film companies started. Nonetheless, the box office
results in 1917 “broke previous records” and improved “by 33
percent 1916, which was itself also a banner year.”68
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The Interwar Period
After 1918–19, the collapsed Russian film industry was reborn
as Bolshevik cinema. The production of films on revolutionary topics replaced those on usual war themes that anyway
had reached only a decreasing audience since 1915. Denise
Youngblood, Karen Petrone, and Alexandre Sumpf, in their
studies on Russian and Soviet Commemoration of World War
One, have also examined the role the Great War played in Soviet
interwar film productions.69 Sumpf, for instance, refers to Soviet
montage films like Esfir Shub’s The Fall of the Romanov Dynasty
(1927) or Evgenii Iakushin´s The World War (1929).70 Significantly,
in The Fall of the Romanov Dynasty, the assassination of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand was not even mentioned, while concentrating especially on the social consequences of the conflict.71 According to
Sovetskii Ėkran, the enemies of Russia in “The World War” simply
appeared as “imperialists.” The audience, however, was confronted with an elephant from a “German zoo” who had to replace a
railroad engine.72
Denise Youngblood emphasizes “the extremely tangential role
the Great War played” in revolutionary films like, for example,
Eisenstein´s famous October (1928). She stresses that many of
the revolutionary films included only some references to World
War One, “but by no stretch could they be labelled ‘war films’ in
69
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the sense that European and American directors were making
films about the world war that focused on the trials of soldiers
at the front and in the trenches.”73 The only important Soviet
film of the 1920s “in which Word War One battle time occupies significant screen time” is, as Youngblood states, Aleksandr
Dovshenko’s film Arsenal (1929).74 In regard to productions of
the 1930s that were dealing with the war, she concentrates on an
analysis of Boris Barnet´s Okraina (1932).75 Aleksandre Sumpf,
beyond Okraina and Arsenal, quotes other Soviet interwar feature films “wholly or partially about the Great War.” Among
those are: Comrade Abram (1919), Enemies (1924), Women of
R´iazan (1929), God of War (1929), Her Way (1929), Merchants
of Glory (1929), Cities and Years (1930), Doomed (1930), Sniper
(1931), Quiet Flows the Don (1931), Three Soldiers (1932), and
The First Platoon (1933) .76
Karen Petrone is convinced that “World War I memory was an
integral part of Soviet culture in the 1920s, even if the war was
often viewed as mere prelude to the Revolution.”77 The fact that,
between 1919 and 1933, the Soviet film industry produced at least
73
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twenty-one fictional and documentary films78 is an endorsement
of Petrone’s assessment in this regard.
It is obvious that the majority of those Soviet films quoted above
were produced at the same time, when films like Westfront 1918.
Vier von der Infanterie (1930, directed by G.W. Pabst) or above all
the American film adaptation of Erich Maria Remarque’s novel,
All Quiet at the Western Front (1930),79 excited and provoked the
audiences in Europe.
Again, there is the question of whether there are any traces of
Austria-Hungary’s participation in the war in Soviet films on the
First World War of this period. Not surprisingly, neither Sumpf and
Youngblood nor Petrone are interested in identifying the “enemy”
in the respective productions either as Germans or as Austrians/
Hungarians. They, more or less, “silently” accept that Soviet films
concentrated on the Germans, often portrayed as proletarian
comrades, abused by imperialism and nationalism and eventually
“enlightened” and purified by experiencing communist solidarity.
Obviously, only in Te, kotorye prozreli (Those who were enlightened,
1930) is the audience confronted with soldiers from the Habsburg
monarchy. According to a short plot description, the film deals
with the events on the Western front in March 1917, ending in
friendship between Russian and Hungarian soldiers. The film,
78
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with its alternative titles Janosh vernëtsja domoj or Janosh priedet
zaftra (Janosh is coming home [tomorrow]) is, it seems, a more
than rare example of the Danube monarchy’s “life after death” in
Soviet interwar film productions.80
In sum, in many Soviet films on the First World War, there
is, as A.M. Belogor´ev points out, an absence of “the enemy.”
81
Cinema was not able to make comprehensible what World
War One was about. The First World War more and more became “an ahistorical symbol of imperialist” and, finally, “fascist,
war.”82 Nevertheless, the “imperialists” are Germans rather than
Austrians, and in regard to “fascists,” the connotation is obvious.
Moreover, it has to be taken into account that due to Germany’s
role concerning Lenin’s return to Russia and its intransigence
in regard to the peace negotiations, the anti-German climate
80
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in revolutionary Russia even increased, whereas the Habsburg
monarchy appeared as a more or less moderate contingent that
was ready to accept compromises. This perception continued
to exist and, as a result, dominated Soviet Russia’s attitude towards “Germans and Austrians,” too. Furthermore, the filmic
concentration on the Germans as adversaries in the conflict
shown corresponded to the Bolsheviks’ constant interest in
German politics and developments, while the Habsburg Empire
had ceased to exist and the Austrians had turned into citizens
of a small and weak state in the heart of Europe. Germany still
played an important role in European politics and in Moscow’s
plannings; Austria and its mediocre Communist Party were only
third-rate.83 It did not match with Bosheviks’ “didactic” understanding of cinema to restore to life a “dead enemy,” instead of
dealing with an existing danger.84 Based on the films seen by
the authoress of this article and due to the characterization of
the films in Soviet journals, there can be no doubt that AustriaHungary in Soviet interwar feature films with references to the
First World War has either completely vanished or left only
vague traces. Furthermore, the remembrance of the First World
War in general began to fade and then disappeared. Films that
picked up the issue of World War One were considered to be
behind the times and therefore needless.
Already at the end of the 1920s, the Communist Party attempted
“to bring political order to Soviet cinema and direct it along a secure
ideological path.” Film productions had to answer Communist
demands in regard to an adequate entertainment of the masses:
83
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“Acknowledging the public’s love of action, adventure and comedy,
which they had become accustomed to through popular Soviet
films and imported American and European films, it was stressed
that movies should provide communist enlightenment, but in
a form ‘intelligible to the millions.’”85 Finally, the Kremlin more
and more insistently wanted cinematography to respond to the
demands of the armed forces and defense, too. Since 1926/1927,
the fear of imminent military attack strongly influenced Soviet
perception of the world. Against this backdrop, Soviet authorities claimed the production of military feature films preparing
the audience for a defensive warfare.86 Cinematography abroad,
asserted the journal Sovetskiy Ėkran had already begun its “war”
against the USSR.87 In 1930, in the journal Kino i zhizn´ (Cinema
and life), there were complaints about the passiveness of Soviet
cinema in regard of themes like “the defense of our country.”88
Soviet cinema had to become one of the strongest organizers
of the Red Army’s future victory.89 Facing the threat of a future
85
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conflict, cinema was called upon not to copy Western pacifism
or neutralize the German-Soviet antagonism on behalf a proletarian solidarity, as Boris Barnet for Okraina was criticized.90
Even more abrasively attacked than Barnet was the director of
Sniper, Semëon Timoshenko, whom M. Korol´ in the journal
Proletarskoe kino accused of having totally ignored whether his
interpretation of the war was compatible with Lenin’s doctrine
in regard to warfare. Korol’s comments on Timoshenko and his
work were crushing. He argued that Timoshenko´s mindset in
fact had nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism and its attitude
towards questions of peace and war. Sniper, he alleged, was an
example of Western “Remarquism,” completely neglecting the
importance of class conflicts.91 Lewis Milestone’s film adaptation of All Quiet on the Western Front was not shown “publicly”
in the Soviet Union,92 but in a hypertrophic manner the movie
served as example of Western mendaciousness in regard to
pacifistic films. The Soviet people had to be indoctrinated that
the only country that really wanted peace was, of course, the
Soviet Union.
Various factors are responsible for the marginalization and, finally, the disappearance of World War I-related films from the Soviet
screen in the 1930s. Karen Petrone in this connection refers to
“many bureaucratic and ideological forces and economic constraints
within the Soviet Union pushing against continued emphasis on
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World War I.”93 Propagandistic efforts to make Soviet people aware
of future conflicts have to be taken into account in particular. World
War One obviously was not suited for creating an unconditional
readiness for war among Soviet people. The “imperialistic” conflict
of the past could not give positive example of patriotic duty as it was
required by the communist fatherland in the 1930s. When Soviet cinema made the transition to sound in this period, encapsulating and
cutting off from the Western cinema, it was instructed to abandon
the avant-garde practices of the 1920s and to accept the guidelines of
socialist realism. Cinema had to create positive heroes and obedient
citizens to support the course of the Communist Party and to defend
the motherland against invaders. The most famous example of films
that had to convey an optimistic type of patriotism was E. Dzigan’s
Esli zaftra voina (If War Comes Tomorrow), released in 1938.94
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1945–2014
“The cataclysm of World War II forever changed the meaning and
also the name of World War I in the Soviet Union as in the rest of
Europe. In the last years of Stalin´s reign, the overwhelming task
of rebuilding the country despite the loss of perhaps as many as
twenty-seven million people overwhelming eclipsed the remembrance of World War I.”95 In fact, after 1945, attention to World
War One was only sporadic. Soviet cinema was not an exception.
As Alexandre Sumpf shows, only very few films, for instance,
Agoniia (Agony, 1975, directed by Elem Klimov), referred to the
Great War but did not put it in the center of interest.96 In addition,
A.M. Belogor´ev quotes the TV drama Zhizn´ Klima Samgina
(Life of Klim Samgin), a 1986 adaption of Maksim Gor´kii´s novel,
Bumbarash (1971), told along with one of Arkadii Gaidar’s early literary works; or Skorbnoe beschuvstvo (Mournful Unconsciousness,
1986, directed by Aleksandr Sukorov), a high-grade experimental
adaption of George Bernard Shaw’s play Heartbreak House, which
because of its intransigence of (non-)narration probably met with
no response among a broader audience. Besides, in 1987, Aleksandr
Muratov adapted for screen a novel by Valentin Pikul´. According
to Belogore´ev, Moonzund is the only film in the period between
1945 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union that really focused
on the First World War, by showing the situation of the Russian
navy at the Baltic Sea. Furthermore, Belogor´ev points to the film
adaptations of Mikhail Sholokhov’s Tikhii Don (And Quiet Flows
the Don, 1957–1958 by Sergei Gerasimov and 1986–1992 by Sergei
Bondarchuk) and Aleksei Tolstoi’s Khozhdeniia po mukam (Life
of suffering, 1957–1959 by Grigorii Roshalem and 1977 by Vasilii
95
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Ordynskii). In these films—rarely enough—Austrian soldiers and
officers appear. The concept of the enemy however differs very
much. In both adaptations of Tichii Don, the Austrian soldier who
is killed by one of the central characters is more or less a victim
of the circumstances,97 whereas in Roshalem’s version of Tolstoy’s
novel the Austrians are characterized as tormentors of Russian
prisoners of war.98
In the 1990s, Russian cinema turned to various themes and started to rethink also the Soviet past. Nikita Mikhalkov’s Utomlënnye
solntsem (Burnt by the Sun, 1994), for instance, depicted the fate of
a senior Red Army officer and his family during the “Great Purges,”
and The Thief (1997, directed by Pavel Chukhrai) showed a young
mother and her son’s everyday struggle for survival in the late 1940s
through the early 1950s. Finally, Russian cinema and TV discovered history before Russia had become communist. In doing so,
Russian films followed the official course of a gradual rehabilitation
of the Tsarist Empire, as well as its sovereigns and “servants”—if
only so they could be introduced as patriots. Putin had “recognized
the enormous potential of cinema” and, of course, also of TV “for
nation building purposes”99 and for his patriotic campaign. As a
result, history before the Bolshevik Revolution was integrated in a
“patriotic re-interpretation” of Russian history as a whole.
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A lot of persons engaged in the cultural sector did and do
support Putin’s course. Nikita Mikhalkov, as one of Russia’s lead
filmmakers, contributed to the new approach to Russia’s past, too.
In his work, he addressed Russia in the turbulent period between
the 1870s and 1930s. His “love of the military as a key producer
of collective subjectivity” is manifested, for example, in Sibirskiy
Tsiriul´nik (The Barber of Siberia, 1998), dedicated to “Russian
officers, the pride of the Fatherland.”100 The positive image of
Tsarist officers replaced their damnation in the Soviet era. The
restoration of Tsarist army’s reputation was no longer taboo.
In 2005, Russian TV produced Gibel´ imperii (The Fall of the
Empire), a television series with 10 episodes, depicting the struggle of Tsarist military intelligence in the First World War and the
role of intelligence officers after the caesura of 1917. German antagonists and, in very rare cases, Austrian spies and traitors figure
only on the very margins of six episodes. The main characters,
Russian intelligence officers and their families, are patriotic heroes and, finally, victims of unpatriotic evil, criminal revolutionaries and brutalized soldiers. Gibel´ imperii brings a rehabilitation
of Tsarist officers, insinuating that former social order was not
that false: Officers do know what has to be done, soldiers don’t,
and beautiful middle -class women are morally and intellectually
superior to superstitious and featherbrained house maids. The
audience is confronted with a stirring drama of Russia’s downfall and a tragic struggle of super-patriots to protect their home
country from alien invaders and then, in 1917, from traitors to
their own country. Andrei Kravchuk in the Admiral (2008) gives a
similar interpretation of the war by presenting Admiral Kolchak as
a superhero. The costly action film on Kolchak’s fate made it quite
100
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plain that the “white Admiral” was a real patriot who served Russia
until his death.101
Batal´on´´. Pervii Zhenskii. Bessmertnyi (Battalion, 2014, directed by Dmitrii Meshkiev), however, is the most impressive example
of the Russia’s recent interpretation of World War One. The film,
produced by Fëdor Bondarchuk, was supported by official Russian
authorities, including the Russian Military Historical Society. The
latter had been reconstituted in 2012 by the President of Russia,
“with the goal of consolidating the resources of the State and the
Society for the study of Russia’s Military-Historical past, facilitating
the study of national military history and counteracting attempts to
distort it, as well as to popularize the achievements of military-historical study, encourage patriotism, and raise the prestige of military service.”102According to this characterization by the Society
itself, the film obviously had to correspond with the aims cited. Its
Chairman, the ministry of culture, Vladimir Medinskii, on the occasion of the production of Battalion, said that WWI “has always
been badmouthed.” “We hope,” he added, that the film “will restore
some honor in the minds of the people about their motherland.”103
The story of Battalion is based on real events during WWI. It depicts the establishment of a battalion of female soldiers in the era of
the Provisional Government by Maria Bochkareva. Facing chaotic
101
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demobilization and the breakdown of the Western front, Bochkareva
aimed to “save the motherland,” left alone in its struggle for survival
by soldiers “blinded by notions of false freedom.”104 Members of the
military and administration in 1917 “were enthusiastic about the idea
of a unit consisting of women, believing that female soldiers would
have powerful propaganda value. They thought it would revitalize the
downtrodden and fatigued male soldiers, shaming them into resuming combat duties.”105 In fact, the battalion’s impact on Russian warfare
between February and October Revolutions was marginal. Still, the
message of the film is obvious: To protect one’s motherland is a “sacred
duty,” notwithstanding the prospects of success. Interestingly, most of
the men shown on the screen, irrespective of whether they are Russian
or German, are either cruel or primitive or cowardly and depraved.
So, one can reason, the ideal “creature” of current Russian patriotic
self-concept is half man half woman, and above all loyal.106 Putin’s
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various statements on his understanding of patriotism, “as well
as the patriotic education program documents, make clear that
among the major indicators of loyalty to the state are military
service and a pledge to defend the state.”107
In Kino-Kultura, Stephen M. Norris wrote very critically
about Battalion, which had disposed a budget of about ten
million dollars. He highlighted the propagandistic mission of
the production and the use of history as a, in fact, replaceable
setting without any expedient information for the audience:
“Meshkiev’s Battalion does not delve into anything that might
offer nuance or detract from its overall patriotic mythistory.
We do not learn much about the Great War, why and where
the Women’s Battalion fought, or much about Bochkareva’s
backstory.” 108 So, it could not be a surprise that, once more,
it was not of much importance for the filmmakers who
fought against whom and for what reason. Nevertheless, the
Germans are brutal and act perfidiously. It becomes evident
that differences between the depiction of Germans in World
War One and Germans in World War Two in Russian cinema
dissolve. Austria-Hungary, however, is not even mentioned in
Battalion.
As Stephen M. Norris, referring to Larisa Maliukova´s review
in the Novaia gazeta, concludes: The film “uses the past to bang
out a message to contemporary audiences. Battalion is not a
movie to watch if you want to ‘see history’ and learn anything
about the Women’s Battalion of Death in 1917. It is a movie to
107
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watch if you want to see how contemporary patriotism gets articulated and mapped onto the past.”109
To restore the Tsarist army’s honor, and to show that there is
reason for Russian people to be proud of its performance until the
uprising of October 1917, was also a goal of various documentary
films that were released on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of
the outbreak of the Great War.
Of course, these films do not get along without explaining the
role of Austria-Hungary, especially in regard to the outbreak of
the conflict. But, generally, the Habsburg state remains a dim
something. Its army enters the scene only for some select moments. While, for instance, several Germany’s military leaders
are introduced by characterizing them as able, but also terrifying
adversaries (for instance General August von Mackensen), the
Austrian Chief of the General Staff General Franz Conrad von
Hötzendorf is not even mentioned. Sporadically, soldiers of the
Habsburg forces appear as POWs. The “great retreat” of Russian
troops in 1915 as a result of German-Austrian offensive appears
as “national tragedy.”110 All the more, in those episodes of the
production Istorija Rossija XX veka that are dedicated to the First
World War, the filmmakers are above all interested in showing
how bravely the Russians fought. The patriotic officers of the
Tsarist army are cast as victims of unpatriotic revolutionaries.
Russia’s enemies were predominant only because of their technological and economic superiority, not in terms of the fighting
spirit and the bravery of officers and soldiers as well. Western
states, whether they were allies or enemies, appear as more or
less morally rotten players. France and Great Britain succeed
109
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because of Russian soldiers’ sacrifice.111 The Germans had ruthlessly attacked the Tsarist Empire, and the Danube monarchy
is accused for having deported thousands of “Russians” (i.e.,
Ruthenen or Ukrainians) in various “death camps”—war crimes
that were hushed by Western Europe until today. Actually, on
the eve of World War I, the Austrian authorities had begun a
wave of persecution against the Russophiles in Galicia. Hundreds
were arrested and brought to camps in Austria. In the Thalerhof
camp, approximately 2,000 internees died, most of them as a consequence of epidemics and horrendous living conditions. Only
in recent years was the internment of so called “Russophiles”
examined by Austrian historians.112 The death toll among internees, refugees, and POWs in Austria-Hungary was immense.
The reasons are complex. The makers of the above-mentioned
documentary film on World War One, however, were not interested in a balanced and differentiated analysis. They imply a
conjunction of the fate of “Russian” people during World War
One and Nazi mass murders. Furthermore, the audience learns
that the “Ukrainian people” was a propagandistic invention
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of Russia’s enemies,113 and that there is only a minor difference
between the crimes of Nazi Germany in the Second World War
and the oppression Russians (not Ukrainians!) suffered in the
First World War. The production, which was financially supported by Russian Orthodox Church, intends to unmask a Western
Europe that is only ironically called “civilized.” The anti-Western
and anti-Semitic tenor is unmistakable. Experts of the “Russian
Institute for Strategic Studies,” established by the President of the
Russian Federation, present a narrative of World War One that
outlines why present-day Russia must be aware of—that is the
message—Western Europe’s presumptuousness and contempt of
Russian people. One can read this interpretation of Russia’s role
in the First World War as advising self-isolation and retreat to a
“better,” namely a “Russian,” world.
In general, the remembrance of the First World War in recent
Russian feature and documentary films114 exhibits “aspects of
émigré military commemorative practice,” namely “the prominence of religion and the Orthodox Church,” the “valorization”
of the imperial army115 and a certain nostalgia for the Romanov
monarchy. This combination, however, is complemented by a
mixture of Soviet paradigms and recent re-interpretations. The
emphasis on Soviet-German antagonism and the alienation from
the former allies, followed by a complete discord among the
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former partners, undoubtedly are perseverative narratives. Today,
World War I is not a “war forgotten” in Russia, but a war “transformed”: defeat has been turned into victory. The current official
Russian notion that “victory is tied very closely to an emerging” or
already emerged and prevailing “view of the war as a heroic one in
which Russian soldiers fought valiantly and demonstrated ‘mass
heroism’. This stands in contrast both to long-standing Western
notions that the Russian soldier fought poorly in the First World
War and Soviet claims that after a very brief period of chauvinistic
fervour, the Russian soldier refused to fight.”116 Russian fictional
and documentary films have processed these notions and generated representations of war as tools for a patriotic re-interpretation
of the Tsarist Empire’s last war. Lacking a plausible utility in terms
of being relevant for present Russia’s politics, the “deceased Dual
Monarchy” in this conception can easily be neglected or even
forgotten.
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